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Flynn: Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: Sex, Gender and the Definition of Se

SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT:
SEX, GENDER AND THE DEFINITION OF
SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE VII
INTRODUCTION

In 1964, Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, l
which includes the following prohibition:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. . . .2

This statute prohibits sex discrimination in employment.
Compare the following statements of judicial interpretation of
this statute: "Title VII was enacted in order to remove those
artificial barriers to full employment which are based upon
unjust and long-encrusted prejudice. Its aim is to make careers
open to talents irrespective of ... sex."3 "The goal of Title VII is
equal employment opportunity.... The discrimination Congress
was concerned about ... is one stemming from ap imbalance of
power and an abuse of that imbalance by the powerful which
results in discrimination against a discrete and vulnerable
group.»4 Both statements were ·offered to support the denial of
sexual harassment actions brought under the sex discrimination
provisions of Title VII.5 However, an important difference exists
between the two cases from which the statements originated. In
Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (Tomkins n, the
harassment occurred between a man and a woman;6 in Goluszek
v. Smith, both parties were men. 7

1. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (1994).
2. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
3. Tomkins v. Public Servo Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976)
[hereinafter Tomkins 1].
4. Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. lli. 1988).
5. Id.; Tomkins I, 422 F. Supp. at 556.
6. Tomkins I, 422 F. Supp. at 555.
7. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1453.
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Why is the difference important? Because the theories
presented in Tomkins I, which deny relief under federal law to
women harassed by men, have long since been abandoned;8
sexual harassment is now recognized as a form of sex
discrimination under Title VII.9 However, same-sex sexual
harassment, a topic virtually ignored during the development of
the sexual harassment cause of action, has recently become the
focus of controversy in federal COurtS,10 and has led to
controversy reflected by a split in the federal courts over the
actionability of same-sex sexual harassment under Title VIlll
This Note will examine the same-sex sexual harassment
conflict. Section. I will review the history of sexual harassment
8. Tomkins v. Public Servo Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1045 (3d. Cir. 1977)
[hereinafter Tomkins 11] (reversing Tomkins I and holding that sexual harassment is
actionable under Title VII).
9. See Meritor Sav. Bank V. Vmson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (recognizing sexual
harassment as an action under Title VII sex discrimination prohibitions).
10. The first case to directly address same-sex sexual harassment did not appear
until 1981. Wright V. Methodist Youth Serv., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D.
1981) (holding that unwelcome sexual advances of a male homosexual IJUpervisor
toward a male employee are actionable as sexual harassment under Title VII). The
majority of cases addressing this issue, both reported and unreported, have arisen
just since 1994. See, e.g., Quick V. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996);
Garcia V. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994); McCoy v. Johnson
Controls World Serv., 878 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. Ga. 1995). In fact, of the many cases
addressing same-sex sexual harassment, only four were decided prior to 1994. See
Polly V. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 825 F. Supp. 135 (S.D. Tax. 1993); Goluszek
V. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. ill 1988); Joyner V. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F.
Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983), affd, 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright V. Methodist
Youth Serv., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. ill 1981).
11. Compare Oncale V. Sundowner Offshore Servo Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 119 (5th Cir.
1996), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3432 (U.S. Dec. 16, 1996) (No. 96-568);
Garcia, 28 F.3d at 451-52 (quoting accord Goluszek V. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452,
1456 (N.D. Dl. 1988) ("Harassment by a male supervisor against a male subordinate
does not state a claim under Title VII...."»; Torres V. National Precision Blanking,
943 F. Supp. 952, 958 (N.D. m. 1996); Schoiber V. Emro Mktg. Co., 941 F. Supp.
730, 732 (N.D. Dl. 1996); Larry V. North Miss. Med. Ctr., 940 F. Supp. 960, 963
(N.D. Miss. 1996); Benekritis V. Johnson, 882 F. Supp. 521, 525-26 (D.S.C. 1995);
with Yeary V. Goodwill Indust.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir. 1997);
Wrightson V. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc. 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[W]e hold that
a same-sex 'hostile work environment' sexual harassment claim may lie under Title
VII...."); Quick V. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996); Tanner V. Prima
Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 354 <D. Nev. 1996); Raney V. District of
Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 288 <D.D.C. 1995); EEOC V. Walden Book Co., 885 F.
Supp. 1100, 1102 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) ("Sexual harassment. . . by a homosexual
supervisor of the same sex is an adverse employment action" under Title VII); Wright
V. Methodist Youth Serv., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. m. 1981); and Marciano V.
Kash n' Karry Foodstores, Inc., No. 94-1657CIV-T-17A, 1996 WL 420879, at *3 (M.D.
Fla. July 1, 1996).

m.
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under Title VII, from early cases denying sexual harassment
actions to the Supreme Court's ultimate recognition of sexual
harassment as a form of sex discrimination. Section IT will
survey the theories used by the federal courts to reject or support
same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII by centering on the
reasoning used by federal courts in deciding this issue. Finally,
Section ill will analyze the viability of the courts' theories on
same-sex sexual harassment in the context of history, statutory
interpretation, and case law.
I. THE HISTORY OF SEXUAL HARAsSMENT UNDER TITLE VII
Although sexual harassment is not expressly' prohibited by
Title VII,12 it is now recognized as a form of sex discrimination
prohibited by the statute.13 Courts initially rejected sexual
harassment claims brought under Title VII;14 these opinions
cited both a lack of congressional intent to cover such cases15
and a reluctance to involve the judiciary in personal
relationships. IS Gradually, however, both the courts and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission17 (EEOC)
recognized the prohibition of sexual harassment under Title VII
and have found that a person who makes unwelcome sexual
advances or creates an offensive sexual atmosphere at work
12. See 42 U.S.CoA § 2000e-2 (1994).
13. Mentor Sav., 477 U.S. at 66 (holding that sexual harassment is actionable
under the sex discrimination prohibitions of Title VII).
14. See, e.g., Tomkins I, 422 F. Supp. at 556 (D.N.J. 1976) (holding sexual
harassment and sexual assault of female employee by male supervisor are not sex
discrimination as defined by Title VIl), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Miller v.
Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (holding employer was not
liable under Title VII for dismissing a female employee who refused a male
supervisor's sexual advances), rev'd on other grounds, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979);
Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 162 (D. Ariz. 1975) (stating that
female employees' claims that their employment had been terminated for refusing a
male supervisor's sexual advances are not cognizable under Title VII), vacated without
opinion, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
15. See Tomkins I, 422 F. Supp. at 556 ("[Title VIrs] aim is to make careers open
to talents irrespective of . . . sex. It is not intended to provide a federal tort remedy
for what amounts to physical attack motivated by sexual desire . . . .").
16. See Miller, 418 F. Supp. at 236 ("The attract10n of males to females and
females to males is a natural sex phenomenon . . . • rut would seem wise for the
Courts to refrain from delving into these matters ..•."); Come, 390 F. Supp. at 163
("By [the supervisor's] alleged sexual advances, [he] was satisfying a personal urge"
and thus the employer is not liable).
17. The EEOC is the federal agency charged by Congress with the enforcement of
Title VII. 42 U.S.CoA § 2000e-5 (1994).
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imposes barriers to equal employment for one gender and not
another. 18 This recognition culminated with the Supreme
Court's ruling in Mentor Savings Bank v. Vinson,19 stating that
sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII. 20

A

Legislative History

Not only is sexual harassment not mentioned in Title VII's
prohibitions, but language prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of sex itself was a last-minute addition to the language of Title
VII,21 which initially was intended primarily to protect against
race discrimination in employment.22 This last-minute addition
was apparently a humorous attempt to defeat the bill; the
representative who proposed the amendment supported his
purported concerns for the "minority sex" with a letter lamenting
the dearth of marriageable men and requesting that government
take action to amend the situation.23 This elicited an amused
reaction from the House of Representatives.24 However, female
Representatives rushed to support the amendment;25 they
remarked upon the irony that those presenting the "sex"
amendment were the most rabid opponents of a bill introduced
months earlier requiring equal pay for women.26
Despite the apparent attempt to defeat Title VII with the
addition of protections against sex discrimination, the
amendment passed on the day it was proposed.27 However, this

18. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982) ("Sexual
harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of one sex
is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial
harassment is to racial equality."); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d
1044, 1048 (3d Cir. 1977); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657 (D.D.C. 1976),
rev'd 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978); EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1994).
19. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
20. Id. at 66.
21. 110 CONGo REc. 2577 (1964).
22. Id. at 2581; see also Dawn M. Buff, Note, Beyond the Court'c Standard
Response: Creating an Effective Test for Determining Hostile Work Environment
Harassment Under Title VII, 24 STETSON L. REv. 719, 725 (1995).
23. 110 CONGo REc. 2577 (1964). The author of the letter takes the government to
task for participating in wars that kill off "marriageable men," thus making them a
scarce commodity. Id.
24. Id. at 2578.
25. Id. at 2578-83.
26. Id. at 2581, 2584.
27. Id. at 2584.
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eleventh-hour addition allowed little discussion regarding
Congress' intentions relating to sex discrimination.28 The dearth
of legislative history on sex discrimination under Title VII thus
offered little guidance to courts first determining whether sexual
harassment claims were actionable under Title VII.28

B. Early Cases Rejecting Sexual Harassment Actions Under Title
VII
When first asked to recognize sexual harassment claims under
Title VII, most federal district courts refused to do SO.30 Their
refusal was based upon the following concerns: (1) adoption of the
theory that Title VII was never intended to extend to sexual
harassment actions,31 (2) an unwillingness to intrude upon
personal or private matters/2 and (3) a fear that allowing such
actions would prompt a flood oflitigation.33
As articulated in Tomkins 1,34 one basis for rejecting sexual
harassment claims brought under Title VII was that Congress
intended Title VII as a remedy for removing barriers to equal
employment opportunities, not as a remedy to attacks based on
sexual desire. 35 In rejecting a sexual harassment action, the
Tomkins I court found that, because the sexual advances were
based on desire and not specifically on the gender of the victim,
they were beyond the reach of Title VII's prohibitions against sex
discrimination.36
Rather than viewing sexual harassment as a sex-based barrier
to employment opportunity, courts relied upon another theory
that sexual harassment was really a "personal proclivity,
peculiarity or mannerism" and an attempt to satisfy "a personal

28. Mentor Sav., 477 U.S. at 64 ("[T]he bill quickly passed as amended, and we
are left with little legislative history to guide us in interpreting [Title Vll's]
prohibition against discrimination based on 'sex.' ").
29. Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 234-35 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd on
other grounds, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F.
Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated without opinion, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
30. Tomkins I, 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D. N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d. Cir.
1977); Miller, 418 F. Supp. at 236; Come, 390 F. Supp. at 163.
31. Tomkins I, 422 F. Supp. at 556; Come, 390 F. Supp. at 163.
32. Miller, 418 F. Supp. at 236; Come, 390 F. Supp. at 163.
33. Tomkins I, 422 F. Supp. at 557; Miller, 418 F. Supp. at 236; Come, 390 F.
Supp. at 163.
34. Tomkins I, 422 F. Supp. at 556.
35. Id.
36. [d.
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urge.,,37 In the absence of employer policies approving of such
sexual advances, the harassment was unrelated to the victim's
employment,38 even though such behavior was distasteful and
an unfortunate occurrence in the workplace.39
Finally, early case law regarding sexual harassment
demonstrates the courts' reluctance to intrude upon these
personal incidents under the rationale that doing so would invite
a flood of litigation.40 To allow sexual harassment claims under
Title VII would turn every "pass" into a potential lawsuit;U
would ignore the reality of natural sexual attraction between
men and women,42 and would invite false claims of sexual
advances as retaliation for negative employment decisions or
discipline.43
C. Early Acceptance Of Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title

VII
The refusal to recognize sexual harassment as actionable
under Title VII was short-lived." Early cases allowing sexual
harassment claims under Title VII did so under a different
theory of Congressional intent: that unwelcome sexual advances
and sexually offensive work environment created the barriers to
employment, which Title VII was meant to eradicate.45 Also,
courts voiced disapproval for the early theories rejecting sexual
harassment claims, including the reluctance to get involved in
personal matters45 and the fear of instigating massive case loads
for COurtS.47

37. Corne, 390 F. Supp. at 163; see also Miller, 418 F. Supp. at 236.
38. Corne, 390 F. Supp. at 163.
39. Tomkins I, 422 F. Supp. at 556.
40. Id. at 557; Corne, 390 F. Supp. at 163.
41. Tomkins I, 422 F. Supp. at 557; Corne, 390 F. Supp. at 163.
42. Miller, 418 F. Supp. at 236.
43. Id.
44. Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. was the first reported case dealing with sexual
harassment under Title VII. 390 F. Supp. 161 (D..Ariz. 1975). The first case allowing
sexual harassment actions under Title VII was decided in 1976. Williams v. Saxbe,
413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd 587 F.2d l240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). By 1977, two
Circuit Court of Appeals had followed suit. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C.
Cir. 1977); Tomkins II, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
45. Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 657-58; Barnes, 561 F.2d at 987; Tomkins II, 568
F.2d at 1047 n.2.
46. Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 660.
47. Id. at 660-61; Tomkins II, 568 F.2d at 1049.
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Instead of excluding sexual harassment claims as beyond Title
VII's scope and the intent of Congress, courts determined that
prohibiting such behavior came squarely under Congress' intent
to eradicate barriers in employment.48 Specifically, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that making sexual advances
toward employees and requiring that they submit to such
advances in order to remain or to advance in employment,
imposes a condition of employment on one gender and not
another.49 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals dubbed this
construction of prohibited behavior under Title VII as the "but
for" test-but for the gender of the victim, he or she would not be
harassed.50
In response to the argument that sexual harassment was a
personal matter into which the judiciary should not interfere, the
D.C. District Court was the first to reject the notion that it was
the victim's willingness (or lack thereof) to enter into such a
personal relationship and respond to the sexual desires of the
harasser rather than the victim's gender that was made a
condition of employment.51 In Williams v. Saxbe,52 the court
refused to give credence to this argument, stating that requiring
such a choice of one gender rather than another in and of itself
was prohibited conduct under Title VII.53
Finally, the Circuit Courts of Appeal that first allowed sexual
harassment claims under Title VII did so even in the face of
possibly limitless litigation stemming from every initiation of
social contact in the workplace.54 The Third Circuit stated the
"congressional mandate that the federal courts provide relief is
strong; it must not be thwarted by concern for judicial
economy."55 The D.C. Circuit allowed that Congress may have

48. Tomkins II, 568 F.2d at 1046-47 0.2; Barnes, 561 F.2d at 987; Williams, 413 F.
Supp. at 657-58.
49. Tomkins II, 568 F.2d at 1046-47.
50. Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990 ("But for her womanhood, . . . her participation in
sexual activity would never have been solicited. • . • [S]he became the target of her
superior's sexual desires because she was a woman . . . .").
51. Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 657-58.
52. Id. at 654.
53. Id. at 659.
54. Tomkins II, 568 F.2d at 1049; see also Barnes, 561 F.2d at 994 0.81.
55. Tompkins II, 568 F.2d at 1049. Indeed, it was the very strength of this
mandate, and its remedial nature, which convinced courts that it was necessary to
construe Title VII to prohibit sexual harassment implicitly. See Barnes, 561 F.2d at
994; Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 658.
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recognized this possibility when it acted to prohibit such
discriminatory behavior.56 Moreover, the courts recognized that
existing judicial procedures for weeding out bad faith or frivolous
claims would act to prevent such a flood. 57
D.

Expansion of Sexual Harassment Theory

The earliest cases recognizing sexual harassment claims under
Title VII involved situations in which an employee was
threatened with adverse employment action absent submission to
sexual demands. 58 This type of sexual harassment is known as
quid pro quo59 sexual harassment.60 In .1980, the EEOC issued
guidelines defining what behavior constituted quid pro quo
sexual harassment. 61 However, the EEOC outlined another type
of actionable sexual harassment beyond the quid pro quo action;
this new cause of action was not previously acknowledged by the
62
COurtS. The Guidelines prohibit conduct of a sexual nature that
"has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment.1163
This new type of sexual harassment, known as "hostile
environment harassment,"64 did not require that a tangible loss
of job benefits must be suffered for liability under Title VII, as
was required by quid pro quo harassment.65 The reasoning for
56. Barnes, 561 F.2d at 994 n.81.
57. Tomkins II, 568 F.2d at 1049.
58. See Michelle Ridgeway Peirce, Note, Sexual Harassment and Title VJI-A Better
Solution, 30 B.C. L. REv. 1071, 1081 (1989); Michael D. Vhay, Comment, The Harms
of Asking: Towards A Comprehensive Treatment of Sexual Harassment, 55 U. Cm. L.
REv. 328, 334 (1988).
59. "Something for something." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1248 (6th ed. 1990).
60. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vmson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
61. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.11(a)(I),
(2) (1994). The Guidelines on quid pro quo harassment are as follows:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of... Title VII.
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a
term or condition of an individual's employment, [or] (2) submission to or
rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for
employment decisions affecting such individual. . . .
Id.
62. Vhay, supra note 58, at 336.
63. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1994).
64. Meritor Sav., 477 U.S. at 65.
65. Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective
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this extension was set forth by the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals in Bundy v. Jackson, the first court opinion to
recognize a hostile work environment claim.66 There, the D.C.
Circuit stated that the "psychological and emotional work
environment" is considered part of the conditions of
employment;67 sexual harassment that makes such an
environment hostile and offensive for one gender and not for
another would constitute discrimination on the basis of sex.68 In
other words, whereas quid pro quo sexual harassment claims
dealt with the loss or threat of a loss of a tangible job benefit,
hostile environment sexual harassment claims focused on the loss
of an intangible job benefit-a non-hostile, non-offensive
psychological environment.
In a span of six years, courts shifted from refusing to recognize
sexual harassment claims under Title VII to extending the
prohibitions to include not only direct actions taken against
employees for refusing sexual advances, but also sexual conduct
that would create a hostile work environment. This progression
was ultimately ratified by the Supreme Court in its landmark
decision, Mentor Savings Bank v. Vinson. 69
E.

Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson

The Supreme Court made it very clear that the sex
discrimination provisions of Title VII prohibited sexual
harassment: "Without question, when a supervisor sexually
harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that
supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex.n7O The Court
acknowledged the actionability of both quid pro quo and hostile
environment sexual harassment claims.71 The Court found, as
Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 333, 341 (1990).
66. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
67. Id. at 944-45.
68. Id. at 945. This line of reasoning was also adopted in Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). In Henson, the court established a five-part
test for hostile environment sexual harassment claims. Id. at 903-05. In order to
bring a claim, a plaintiff has to demonstrate that: (I) he or she is a member of a
protected class, that is, male or female; (2) "the employee was subject to unwelcome
sexual harassment"; (3) but for the employee's sex, he or she would not have been
harassed; (4) the harassment affected a condition of employment; and (5) the
employer "knew or should have known of the harassment" and took no action. Id.
69. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
70. Id. at 64 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 64, 66.
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had courts in the early cases recognizing sexual harassment
claims under Title VII,72 that sexual harassment acted as a
barrier to equal employment opportunity in the workplace.73 It
was Congress' intent to strike down these barriers in order " 'to
strike at the entire spectrum. of disparate treatment of men and
women' in employment."74
Thus, Title VII has been extended to cover sexual harassment
claims, despite the fact that it contains neither an express
prohibition against sexual harassment nor even explicit mention
of an intent to do so in the scarce legislative history that exists.
In so extending Title VII, courts have stated the following: (1)
that sexual harassment sets up barriers to equal employment,
barriers which Congress intended to remove via Title VII;76 (2)
that such barriers are sex discrimination because sexual
harassment imposes a condition of employment on one gender
and not another;76 (3) that there is a cause of action for hostile
work environment sexual harassment as well as for quid pro quo
actions;" and (4) that unwelcomeness is the essential element of
sexual harassment actions under Title VII.78
II.

THE SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARAsSMENT CONFLICT

While it is now well-settled that opposite-sex sexual
harassment is prohibited by Title VII's sex discrimination
provisions, a new controversy has recently arisen regarding
same-sex sexual harassment-that is, situations in which the
harasser and the harassee are of the same gender.79 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals has opined on the issue, flatly stating
that Title VII does not apply to same-sex sexual harassment
claims.80 The Fourth Circuit has rejected this absolute
72. See, e.g., Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657-58 (D. D.C. 1976), rev'd 587
F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
73. Mentor Sav., 477 U.S. at 67.
74. Id. at 64 (citation omitted).
75. Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 657-58.
76. Tomkins II, 568 F.2d 1044, 1046-47 (3d. Cir. 1977).
77. Meritor Sav., 477 U.S. at 64, 66.
78. Id. at 68.
79. See Pamela J. White & Stephanie A Baldanzi, Same·Sex Sexual Harassment
Now Unpredictable Area of Law, 4 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION REPoRTER 240 (Feb.
22, 1995).
80. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 119-20 (5th Cir. 1996),
petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3432 (U.S. Dec. 16, 1996) (No. 96-568); Garcia v.
Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994).
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prohibition on same-sex sexual harassment claims under Title
VII.sl However, when dealing with hostile environment claims,
the Fourth Circuit, differentiating between situations involving
homosexual harassers82 and those involving heterosexual
harassers, has held that only in the first instances are sexual
harassment claims actionable.83 The Sixth Circuit has similarly
recognized that a same-sex sexual harassment claim resulting
from the harassment of a homosexual supervisor is actionable,
although it has thus far refused to draw the same heterosexualhomosexual distinction as the Fourth Circuit.54 Finally, the
Eighth Circuit has adopted a broader categorization of actionable
same-sex sexual harassment claims under Title VII to include
situations in which both the harasser and his or her victim are
heterosexual.85 Four other Circuit Courts of Appeals have
expressed in dicta a reluctance to exclude such claims from Title
VII coverage.86 The remaining Circuit Courts of Appeals have so
far been silent on the issue. Federal district courts are split on
the issue, albeit not evenly;87 the majority of courts have
81. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc. 99 F.3d 138, 141 (4th Cir. 1996).
82. Id.
83. McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 (4th Cir.),
eert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996). Note, however, that the Circuit Court has not yet
expressed an opinion on the actionability of same-sex quid pro quo claims, although it
has indicated a willingness to hold them actionable. Id. at 1195 n.4.
84. Yeary v. Goodwill Indust.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir. 1997).
85. Quick. v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1378-79 (8th Cir. 1996).
86. Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995) ("IWle do not
mean to exclude the possibility that sexual harassment of . . . men by other men, or
women by other women would not also be actionable in appropriate cases."); Steiner
v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994), eert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 733 (1995) ("[W]e do not rule out the possibility that both men and women
working at Showboat have viable claims against [a male] for sexual harassment.");
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 n.11 (11th Cir. 1982) ("Except in the
exceedingly atypical case of a bisexual supervisor, it should be clear that sexual
harassment is discrimination based upon sex."); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990
n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (rejecting defense's argument that a man could make sexual
advances toward a man as easily as toward a woman; "In each instance, the legal
problem would be identical . . . the exaction of a condition which, but for his or her
sex, the employee would not have faced."); see also Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp.,
597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983), affd, 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984) (affirming
without opinion the district court's recognition of a same-sex sexual harassment cause
of action).
87. See Schoiber v. Emro Mktg. Co., 941 F. Supp. 730, 737 <N.D. m. 1996) (holding
that Garcia and the cases following its reasoning correctly interpreted Title vn as
not covering same-sex sexual harassment claims); Larry v. North Miss. Med. Ctr., 940
F. Supp. 960, 963 <N.D. Miss. 1996) (dismissing same-sex sexual harassment claim
because bound by Fifth Circuit precedent); Myers v. City of El Paso, 874 F. Supp.

Published by Reading Room, 1997

HeinOnline -- 13 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1109 1996-1997

11

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 9

1110

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:1099

allowed, or at least have recognized the viability of, same-sex
sexual harassment claims under Title VII.BS The issue is so
confused that the U.S. Supreme Court has requested that the
U.S. Department of Justice submit a brief outlining its views on
the actionability of same-sex harassment claims under Title
VII.89
Recognition of same-sex sexual harassment claims ranges from
complete rejection of such claims to acceptance of same-sex
claims on the same basis as opposite sex claims/a with several
courts staking out the middle ground and only allowing certain
such claims (for example, allowing only quid pro quo actions or
factual scenarios involving homosexuals).91 Courts that flatly
1546, 1548 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (following Garcia); Benekritis v. Johnson, 882 F. Supp.
521, 526 <D. S.C. 1995) (refusing to recognize same-sex sexual harassment claim
under Title VII).
88. See, e.g., McCoy v. Macon Water Auth., No. 5:94-CV-480-4(HL), 1997 WL 50037,
at *6 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 1997) (allowing same-sex sexual harassment claims comports
with Title VITs language and existing sexual harassment case law); Miller v. Vesta,
Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697, 701 (E.D. Wis. 1996); Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp.
1403, 1409 (E.D. Wis. 1996) ("[Slame-sex harassment claims are cognizable under
Title Vll"); Gerd v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 357 <D. Colo. 1996);
Marciano v. Kash rr Karry Foodstores, Inc., No. 94-1657CIV-T-17A, 1996 WL 420879,
at *3-4 (M.D. Fla. July 1, 1996) (holding hostile environment same-sex: sexual
harassment cases are actionable under Title Vll; quid pro quo actions are not);
Tietgen v. Browrrs Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1500 (E.D. Va. 1996)
(holding Title Vll prohibits sexual harassment regardless of the "gender combination"
of the parties involved); Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C.
1996); EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1104 (M.D. Tenn. 1995);
Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., 94 CIV. 5458{LAP), 1995 WL 640502, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1995) (holding same-sex sexual harassment to be actionable under
Title Vll).
89. Court Asks for Administration's View on Whether to RelJiew Same·Sex Issue, 7
EMPL. DISCRIMINATION REP. 765 <Dec. 18, 1996).
90. Compare Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994)
(holding same-sex sexual harassment claims not actionable under Title VII) with
Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 354 (D. Nev. 1996) (holding
same-sex sexual harassment claims actionable under Title Vll, using the same
elements of proof as opposite sex harassment cases).
91. Compare McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996) (holding that hostile environment sexual
harassment action where harasser and victim are both heterosexuals is not actionable
under Title VII) with Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc. 99 F.3d 138, 141 (4th Cir.
1996) (holding when harasser is homosexual, same-sex sexual harassment claim is
actionable); see also Marciano v. Kash N' Karry Foodstores, Inc., No. 94-1657CIV-T17A, 1996 WL 420879, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 1, 1996) (allowing hostile environment,
but not quid pro quo, same-sex sexual harassment cases under Title VII);
Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'! Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (same-sex
sexual harassment can only be actionable when anti-male or anti-female environment
is created in the workplace).
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reject all same-sex sexual harassment claims .do so on one theory:
namely, that Congress intended Title VII as a tool to balance
power inequalities in the workplace and never intended for samesex sexual harassment to come under that protection.92
Courts that allow same-sex sexual harassment actions, all or
in part, have reasoned by way of the following: (1) the plain
language of both the statute and the Supreme Court's decision in
Mentor Savings Bank v. Vinson do not restrict Title VII coverage
to opposite sex situations;93 (2) the EEOC, as the appointed
enforcer of Title VII, has interpreted the statute to allow samesex claims;94 (3) the "but-for" test established early in the
history of sexual harassment law requires that harassment that
an employee would not suffer but for his or her sex must be
labeled sexual harassment, regardless of the harasser's gender;95
(4) that dicta in the earliest sexual harassment cases implies
such actions should be allowed;96 and (5) that theories currently
accepted in sexual harassment law, including reverse
discrimination and actions alleging other-than-sexual behavior,
lead courts to hold that same-sex sexual harassment cannot be
excluded from Title VII protection.97

92. See Garcia, 28 F.3d at 451-52 (citing Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452
(N.D. m. 1988); Schoiber v. Emro Mktg. Co., 941 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. TIl. 1996);
Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489, 493-94 CW.D. Wash. 1995); Benekritis v.
Johnson, 882 F. Supp. 521, 525-26 CD.S.C. 1995».
93. See Miller v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697, 702 CE.D. Wis. 1996); Johnson v.
Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1403, 1409 CE.D. Wis. 1996); Tietgen v. Brown's
Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1500 CE.D. Va. 1996); Williams v.
District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. I, 7 CD.D.C. 1996); Griffith v. Keystone Steel &
Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1136-37 (C.D. TIl. 1995).
94. See Swage v. The Inn Phlla., Civ. A. No. 96-2380, 1996 WL 368316, at *2 (E.D.
Pa. June 21, 1996); Gerd v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 934 F. Supp. 357 CD. Colo.
1996); Ecklund v. Fruisz Tech., Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335, 337 (E.D. Va. 1995).
95. Gerd, 934 F. Supp. at 361; Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283,
286 (D.D.C. 1996); EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (M.D. Tenn.
1995), relJ'd 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996); Wright v. Methodist Youth Serv., Inc., 511
F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. m. 1981).
96. See Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368, 1378 (C.D. Cal.
1995); Griffith, 887 F. Supp. at 1136; Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. at 1102 n.3;
Boyd v. Vonnahmen, No. 93-CV-4358-JPG, 1995 WL 420040 at *3 (S.D. TIl. Mar. 29,
1995); McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Serv., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D. Ga.
1995).
97. See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1378-79 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding
sexual harassment claim does not have to involve behavior expressing sexual interest
or requesting sexual favors to be actionable); Swage v. The Inn Phlla., Civ. A. No.
96-2380, 1996 WL 368316, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 1996) (holding it inconsistent to
allow reverse discrimination cases but not same-sex sexual harassment cases); Easton,
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The Rejection of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims

The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Garcia v. Elf Atochem North
America,98 which reject same-sex sexual harassment claims,99
has been cited as support by all later decisions also rejecting
such claims. loo Unfortunately, the decision offers little to
analyze on its face. The court's reasoning consists of two
sentences: "[H]arassment by a male supervisor against a male
subordinate does not state a claim under Title VII even though
the harassment has sexual overtones. Title VII addresses gender
discrimination."lol Such brevity frustrates an analysis of the
holding, but there are two mitigating factors. First, Goluszek v.
Smith,102 the authority cited by the Garcia court in support of
its brief statement,l03 explains in greater detail what is meant
by "gender discrimination.,,104 Second, some district courts
following the court's ruling have discussed their own reasoning in
greater detail. lOS
1.

Goluszek v. Smith and the Imbalance of Power

Goluszek v. Smith involved a hostile environment sexual
harassment claim brought by a man whose co-workers
commented incessantly about his supposed sexual inexperience
and accused him of being a homosexual. lOG The court rejected

905 F. Supp. at 1379 (reverse discrimination cases demonstrate that not only
"minority" group entitled to protection under Title Vll).
98. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
99. Id. at 451-52.
100. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 119 (5th Cir. 1996),
petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3432 (U.S. Dec. 16, 1996) (No. 96-568); Schoiber v.
Emro Mktg. Co., 941 F. Supp. 730, 731 (N.D. ill 1996); Larry v. North· Miss. Med.
Ctr., 940 F. Supp. 960, 963 (N.D. Miss. 1996); Ashworth v. Roundup Co.. 897 F.
Supp. 489, 494 (W.D. Wash. 1995); Benekritis v. JohnEon, 882 F. Supp. 621, 526
(D.S.C. 1995); Myers v. City of El Paso, 874 F. Supp. 1546, 1548 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
Note that in both Oncale and Larry, the courts seemed unenthusiastic about following
Garcia, repeated several times that they were impelled to accept the Garcia decision
as binding precedent, and cited to the extensive opposition in other COurt3 to the
decision. See Oncale, 83 F.3d at 119-20; Larry, 940 F. Supp. 963-64.
10L Garcia, 28 F.3d at 451-52 (citation omitted).
102. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. ill 1988).
103. Garcia, 28 F.3d at 452.
104. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456.
105. See, e.g., Schoiber, 941 F. Supp. at 737-39; Ashworth, 897 F. Supp. at 493;
Benekritis, 882 F. Supp. at 525.
106. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1453-54.
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his claim under Title VII. 107 The court's denial was based on its
review of congressional intent in establishing the protections of
Title VII. los Although the court recognized that the purpose of
Title VII was to establish equal opportunity,109 as was
established in earlier sexual harassment cases under Title
VII,l1O it narrowly defined the means Congress intended to
achieve that purpose. 111 The Goluszek court stated that
Congress' intent was to end discrimination based upon "an
imbalance of power and an abuse of that imbalance by the
powerful which results in discrimination against a discrete and
vulnerable groUp."l12 The only authority the court cited for this
proposition was a student-written Note;l13 it cited nothing from
the statute itself, nor to any legislative history. 114
Based upon this view of congressional intent, the court held
that sexual harassment would not be actionable unless the
harassment created an "anti-male environment" in which males
were made to feel inferior because they are male. l15 Because
the plaintiff in Goluszek was a male in a male-dominated
environment, his workplace was not an "anti-male
environment."116 The court recognized that the plaintiff,
Goluszek, may have been the recipient of treatment to which
women would not be subjected, and thus an argument could be
made that he was harassed because he was male. 117 However,
because no anti-male environment resulted, the harassment was

107. Id. at 1456.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Williams v.
Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 658 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
111. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456.
112. Id.
113. Id. (citing Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment
Under Title VII, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1449, 1451-52 (1984».
114. Id.; see also Miller v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697, 704 (E.D. Wis. 1996)
(noting lack of support in student-written note for Goluszek court's conclusions
regarding legislative history for Title VlI); Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F.
Supp. 1, 8-9 (D.D.C. 1996) (criticizing Goluszek court for supporting opinion with
student Note rather than Congressional material); Ton v. Information Resources, Inc.,
No. 95 C 3565, 1996 WL 5322, at *7 (N.D. TIl. Jan. 3, 1996) (criticizing Goluszek for
failure to find support in statute or legislative history); Raney v. District of Columbia,
892 F. Supp. 283, 287 (D.D.C. 1995) (criticizing Goluszek court for failing to cite to
legislative history).
115. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456.
116. [d.
117. [d.
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not actionable under Title VII, and thus Goluszek had no claim
under Title VII. lls
2.

Garcia and Its Progeny

In accepting Goluszek's holding without explication, the Fifth
Circuit in Garcia reduced Goluszek's long discussion of
congressional intent and the requirement of an anti-male
environment to one phrase-"gender discrimination."1l9 Further
discussion of Goluszek's theories did not occur until later opinions
in agreement with the Garcia court were issued. 120 These later
opinions focused solely on the theory of congressional intent,
stating that Congress intended to remedy only those situations in
which disparate treatment in the form of an anti-male or antifemale environment exists. 121 These cases add no new support,
whether from case law or legislative sources, for Goluszek's
claims; they remain supported only by a student-written Note.
However, the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits and many
federal district courts have rejected Garcia's interpretation of
congressional intent and instead have recognized that same-sex
sexual harassment claims are or could be cognizable under Title
VII. 122 The decisions have varied significantly in outlining the
types of same-sex claims that will be recognized,123 the
elements that will constitute proof of a same-sex claim,124 and
118. [d.
119. Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 452 (5th Cir. 1994).

120. See, e.g., Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489, 493 <W.D. Wash. 1995);
Benekritis v. Johnson, 882 F. Supp. 521, 525 (D. S.C. 1995).
121. See Ashworth, 897 F. Supp. at 493; Benekritis, 882 F. Supp. at 525.
122. See, e.g., Yeary v. Goodwill Indust.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir.
1997); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc. 99 F.3d 138, 141 (4th Cir. 1996); Quick v.
Donaldson, 90 F.3d 1372, 1378-79 (8th Cir. 1996); Marciano v. Kash n' Karry
Foodstores, Inc., No. 94-1657ClV-T-17A, 1996 WL 420879, at ·3 (M.D. Fla. July 1,
1996); Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 355 (D. Nev. 1996);
Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 288 (D.D.C. 1995); Griffith v.
Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1136-37 (C.D. ill. 1995); EEOC v. Walden
Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (M.D. Tenn. 1995); McCoy v. Johnson Controls
World Serv., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
123. E.g., compare McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191,
1195 n.4 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996) (declaring that hostile
environment same-sex sexual harassment claims are not actionable under Title VII,
but that quid pro quo same-sex sexual harassment claims are not ruled out) with
Marciano, 1996 WL 420879, at ·3 (holding quid pro quo same-sex sexual harassment
claims are not actionable under Title VII, but hostile environment same-Eex sexual
harassment claims may be brought).
124. E.g., compare Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elee. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 752 (4th

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol13/iss4/9
HeinOnline

-- 13 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1114 1996-1997

16

Flynn: Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: Sex, Gender and the Definition of Se

1997]

DEFINITION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER TlTLE vn

1115

the behavior that will be prohibited by Title VII in the same-sex
context.125 However, the courts have uniformly supported their
decisions to allow these actions with the following: (1) citation to
dicta in the earliest sexual harassment cases that implies such
actions should be allowed;126 (2) utilization of the but for
test,127 also established in the earliest sexual harassment
cases;128 (3) reference to the plain language of Title VII and the
gender-neutral language used by the Supreme Court in Mentor
Savings Bank v. Vinson to establish the actionability of sexual
harassment claims;129 and (4) deference to the EEOC's
interpretation of Title VII, which allows for same-sex sexual
harassment claims. 130

B. The Acceptance of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Cases Under
Title VII
1.

Quid Pro Quo, Hostile Environment, and Sexual Preference

Although a majority of the circuit and district courts that have
addressed the issue of same-sex sexual harassment have held it

Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996) (holding principle method of proving harasser
targeted a victim because of sex: is proving harasser acted out of sexual attraction to
the victim) with Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1996)
(holding that sexual orientation of harasser not determinative of whether same-sex:
sexual harassment claim is actionable).
125. E.g., compare Quick, 90 F.3d at 1378-79 (holding that same-sex: sexual
harassment action could exist for "bagging"-grabbing and squeezing of man's testicles
by male co-workers) with McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1193, 1195 (finding no same-sex:
sexual harassment claim between heterosexual men even where co-workers fondled
victim's genitals and made other sexual contact).
126. See Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368, 1378 (C.D. Cal.
1995); Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1136 (C.D. m. 1995);
EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 n.3 (M.D. Tenn. 1995); Boyd v.
Vonnahmen, No. 93-CV-435t.JFG, 1995 WL 420040 at *3 (S.D. lli. Mar. 29, 1995);
McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Serv., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (M.D. Ga. 1995).
127. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
128. See Gerd v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 934 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D. Colo. 1996);
Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 287 (D.D.C. 1996); Walden Book Co.,
885 F. Supp. at 1102; Wright v. Methodist Youth Serv., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310
(N.D. m. 1981).
129. See Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1403, 1409 (E.D. Wis. 1996); Tietgen
v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1500 n.9 (E.D. Va. 1996);
Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1996); Griffith, 887 F.
Supp. at 1136-37.
130. See Swage v. The Inn Phila. No. Civ. A No. 96-2380, 1996 WL 368316, at *3
(E.D. Pa. June 21, 1996); Gerd, 934 F. Supp. at 361; Ecklund v. Fruisz Tech., Ltd.,
905 F. Supp. 335, 337 (E.D. Va. 1995).
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actionable under Title VII, no consensus exists as to whether all
types of same-sex claims are included. For example, in
McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors,'m the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals examined the sexual harassment
claim of a heterosexual male against several of his male coworkers. 132 Mr. McWilliams complained that his co-workers
asked him about his sexual activities, once placed a condom in
his food, exposed their genitalia to him, and fondled his
genitals.133 However, Mr. McWilliams never claimed nor
presented evidence that those accused were homosexual. 1M In
dismissing Mr. McWilliams' claims, the court held that hostile
environment same-sex sexual harassment claims are not
actionable under Title VII.135 In support of this ruling, the
court, citing the language of Title VII, stated that the activities
alleged by Mr. McWilliams could not have been directed at him
because of his sex.136 Instead, they were perhaps based upon his
sensitivity or the vulgar nature of his tormentors.137 To allow
such claims would expand Title VII's protections beyond the
intent of Congress and the Supreme Court to include broad
protection of "the sensibilities of workers simply 'in matters of
sex.' "138
Marciano v. Kash N Karry Foodstores, Inc.139 presented an
alternative theory for determining which types of same-sex
sexual harassment actions may be brought. In Marciano,l40 the
alleged harasser, a male supervisor, exposed his genitals to Mr.
Marciano, made vulgar comments regarding oral sex, and told

131. 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.· Ct. 72 (1996).
132. Id. at 1193.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1195.
135. Id. The court expressly stated, however, that it was not addressing whether the
homosexuality of any of the parties would allow a hostile environment action to be
brought, or whether a quid pro quo action would be actionable regardless of the
parties' sexual orientation. Id. at 1195 n.4. This issue was later addres£led by the
Fourth Circuit in Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., in which the court held that
same-sex: sexual harassment claims based on the actions of homosexual harassers
were actionable. 99 F.3d 138, 141 (4th Cir. 1996).
136. McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195-96.
137. Id. at 1196.
138. Id.; see also Gibson v. Tanks Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1107, 1108 (M.D.N.C. 1996)
(holding no hostile environment same-sex: sexual harassment claim where both parties
are heterosexual).
139. No. 94-1657-CIV-T-17A, 1996 WL 420879 (M.D. Fla. July 1, 1996).
140. Id. at *1.
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Mr. Marciano he had a "cute butt."141 Mr. Marciano also
claimed that the harasser's actions were proof that the harasser
was homosexual, which made his conduct actionable under Title
VII under McWilliams. l42 However, the court held, contrary to
McWilliams' holding, that the harasser's sexual orientation was
irrelevant in determining whether sexual harassment is
actionable under Title VII.I43 In so holding, the court
differentiated between hostile environment and quid pro quo
sexual harassment actions. 1M The court stated that hostile
environment sexual harassment actions were intended to ensure
employee access to a workplace free of discrimination or
harassment based on their gender and, thus, sexual orientation
is irrelevant. l45 However, with quid pro quo same-sex actions,
discrimination results when a claimant does not share a
homosexual supervisor's sexual preference; the discrimination
would be then based on sexual orientation rather than sex. l45
Such discrimination would not be actionable under Title VII.147
These two examples demonstrate the wide variance in the types
of actions courts have (or have not) found actionable in same-sex
sexual harassment litigation under Title VII.
2.

Elements of Proof

Courts recognizing same-sex sexual harassment claims also
differ in their approaches to the level and elements of proof
necessary to prove such claims. These different evidentiary
standards focus on (1) the role sexual attraction plays in proving
that the harassment occurs because of the victim's sex;l48 (2)
the necessity of proving an environment generally hostile to a

141. 1d.
142. 1d. at *2.
143. 1d. at *3.
144. 1d.
145. 1d.
146. 1d. The court does not address the question of whether a quid pro quo claim
would be valid if the victim of a homosexual harasser was also homosexual.
147. 1d.; see DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & TeL Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979)
(holding sexual orientation discrimination not actionable under Title VII); Dillon v.
Frank, No. 9O-CV-70799-DT, 1990 WI. 358586 CE.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 1990), aff'd 952
F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding no action for sex: discrimination under Title VII
where claimant harassed based on sexual orientation).
148. See Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 752 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996); Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 7
(D.D.C. 1996).
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gender;l49 and (3) the sexual nature of the conduct of the
harasser, which shall be discussed in the context of prohibited
behavior under Title VII.15O The role sexual attraction plays in
finding Title VII same-sex sexual harassment is closely related to
the theories presented in the preceding cases regarding the effect
of a harasser's sexual preference on the actionability of a claim,
in that the discussions of proof and actionability accompany each
other. lSI
In Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., 152 the court
discussed the proof necessary to show that same-sex sexual
harassment has occurred "because of' sex.153 The court case
contrasted opposite-sex sexual harassment claims, in which the
victim is presumed to be the focus of a heterosexual harasser's
actions because of his or her sex, with same-sex sexual
harassment cases, in which such conduct is usually not motivated
by sex.1M These presumptions stem from society's knowledge of
the "realit[ies of] sexual conduct."155 Because of this lack of
presumption in same-sex cases, the victim must prove that he
was harassed because of his sex.156 The court states, "The
principal way in which this burden may be met is with proof that
the harasser acted out of sexual attraction...."157
Several courts have rebutted the assumption that sexual
attraction is a necessary element of proof in same-sex sexual
harassment cases. In Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors,

149. Compare Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'! Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1182 <N.D.
Ind. 1995} (holding that clajmant must establish either an anti-male or anti-female
environment) with Gerd v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 934 F. Supp. 357, 360-61 (D.
Colo. 1996) (holding that work environment does not have to be hostile to all
members of sex, just to individual plaintiff, to be actionable).
150. Compare Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1378-79 (8th Cir. 1996)
(holding harasser's conduct does not have to express sexual interest in or request
sexual favors from victim) with Gerd, 934 F. Supp. at 361 (asking whether conduct is
sexual in nature to determine whether same-sex harassment is actionable as sex
discrimination under Title Vll).
151. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195
n.5 (4th Cir. 1996).
152. 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996).
153. Ill. at 752.
154. Ill.
155. Ill.
156. Ill. (emphasis added).
157. Ill.; see also Shermer v. lllinois Dept. of Transp., 937 F. Supp. 781 (C.D. m.
1996) (recognizing difficulty in meeting burden of proof in same-sex sexual
harassment cases without proof of sexual attraction).
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Inc./58 the court acknowledged that a same-sex sexual
harassment plaintiff might fail to allege sufficient facts required
to state a case that he had been discriminated against on the
basis of gender; however, it also rejected the argument that the
plaintiff had to prove the harasser's sexual attraction to him. The
court stated that in this case the facts as alleged could be
sufficient to support the plaintiffs claim without such proof.159
Similarly, in Swage v. The Inn Philadelphia,l60 the court
refused to hold that a same-sex sexual harassment plaintiff
would be unable to prevail in the absence of proof of the
harasser's sexual orientation.161
In Goluszek, discussed above, the court rejected a same-sex
sexual harassment claim on the basis that the objectionable
conduct did not result in an anti-male environment.162 It held
that such an environment was necess~ to establish a claim
under Title VII, which Congress enacted to rectify inequalities
and remove "discriminatory intimidation."l63 Some courts that
have rejected Goluszek to find that same-sex sexual harassment
is actionable under Title VII have still incorporated the "antimale environment" test as an element of same-sex claims. l64
Other courts, however, including the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, have rejected the requirement that the harassment
must create an anti-male or -female environment. In Quick v.
Donaldson Co., 165 the court stated, "Protection under Title
VII ... extends to all employees and prohibits disparate
treatment of an individual, man or woman, based on that
person's sex. The district court therefore erred in requiring ...
evidence of an anti-male or predominantly female work

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

921 F. Supp. 1495 (E.D. Va. 1996).
Id. at 1502. The plaintiff's complaint thus withstood a motion to dismiss. Id.
Civ. A. No. 96-2380, 1996 WL 368316 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 1996).
Id. at *4.
Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Dl. 1988); see discussion

supra Part II.A.1.

163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 805, 808 (N.D. Ind.
1995) (acknowledging it would be "Id]ifficult, but not impossible" to prove that samesex sexual harassment resulted in necessary anti-male environment to state a Title
VII claim); Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'! Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1182 (N.D. Ind.
1995) (recognizing that same-sex sexual harassment might be actionable under Title
VII and requiring that an anti-male or anti-female environment be established for
same).
165. 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996).

Published by Reading Room, 1997

HeinOnline -- 13 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1119 1996-1997

21

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 9

1120

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSlTY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:1099

environment."l66 Some courts have thus held that, based on
Title VII's creation of individual claims for discrimination,
requiring a showing of hostility to all members of a gender would
be unwarranted. 167

3. Prohibited Behavior in Same-Sex Sexual Harassment
Claims
There is little argument among the cases allowing same-sex
sexual harassment actions that quid pro quo same-sex
harassmentl68 is actionable under Title VII. 169 However, samesex sexual harassment claims often concern vulgarity and sexual
taunting between men that is unrelated to any sort of sexual
desire; rather, it reflects the sort of uninhibited, coarse behavior
found in settings completely dominated by one gender. 170
Nonetheless, the targets of this behavior may well be treated
differently than if they were women; but for their gender, they
would not be the brunt of this type of harassment. 171 Because of
this unique situation, the question arises whether same-sex
sexual harassment must be "sexual" in nature, in that the object
is to express sexual interest or to request sexual favors, in order
to be actionable under Title VII. 172 In opposite-sex sexual

166. 1d. at 1378 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
167. 1d.; see also Gerd v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 934 F. Supp. 357, 360-61 (D.
Colo. 1996); Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 354 (D. Nev.
1996); EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (M.D. Tenn. 1995).
168. These quid pro quo actions would include instances in which a man makes
sexual demands on a male employee and conditions that person's employment on
submitting to such demands.
169. In fact, the earliest cases recognizing same-sex: sexual harassment as a
co~le claim under Title vn were quid pro quo cases. See Joyner v. AM Cooper
Transp., 597 F. Supp. ~37 (M.D. Ala. 1983), affd, 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984);
Wright v. Methodist Youth Serv., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. ID. 1981).
170. See, e.g., Shermer v. illinois Dept. of Transp., 937 F. Sup. 781 (C.D. ID. 1996)
(finding defendant accused plaintiff on an all-male work crew of having sexual
relations with other men); Gero, 934 F. Supp. at 357 (finding male co-workers groped
and teased plaintiff about sex: life); Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp.
1368 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (finding female supervisors spoke of sexual matters and
exposed their bodies to female employees); Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452
(N.D. ill. 1988) (finding male co-workers teased employee about his sex: life).
171. See, e.g., Quick, 90 F.3d at 1374 ("bagging" or groping of genitalia was not
inflicted on female employees); Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456 (finding employer
would have taken action in response to a complaint of sexual harassment from a
female, unlike plaintiff's situation).
172. See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1378-79 (8th Cir. 1996); Gerd, 934
F. Supp. at 361.
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harassment cases, non-sexual behavior that is nonetheless
intimidating or hostile to one sex has been declared actionable as
sexual harassment under Title VII on the theory that such
treatment singles out one gender for poor treatment. 173 The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that likewise behavior
does not have to be sexual in nature to be actionable in applying
this rule to same-sex sexual harassment claims. 17•
However, most courts have not ruled specifically on whether
conduct must be sexual in nature to be actio~able.175 Rather,
they have looked to the sexual nature of the conduct to determine
whether it is the sort of vulgar treatment between membei's of
the same sex that, while sexual in content, is not meant to
express sexual desire.176 Such conduct targets the victim
because of personal dislike,l77 the victim's sensitivity or
vulnerability,178 or the vulgarity of the harasser/79 but not
because of the victim's sex; thus, Title VII does not apply.
C. Theoretical Underpinnings of the Recognition of Same-Sex

Sexual Harassment Actions Under Title VII
The roots upon which acceptance of same-sex sexual
harassment claims are based can be traced to the original cases
recognizing the actionability of sexual harassment;l8O these
cases acknowledged in dicta that same-sex actions might be
allowed under Title VII. lB1 In Barnes v. Costle,182 for example,
173. Gus v. Hall Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988).
174. Quick, 90 F.3d at 1378-79.
175. However, one case has held that the "determinative inquiry is solely whether
the conduct is sexual in nature" and whether it would have occurred but for the
victim's sex. Gerd, 934 F. Supp. at 361.
176. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1403 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (holding
insults with sexual overtones are based on animosity, not sex, and are not severe
enough to allow an action under Title Vll); Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905
F. Supp. 1368, 1384 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (holding a person who finds sexually charged
atmosphere oppressive because not comfortable with sexuality being openly expressed
does not entail a violation of Title Vll).
177. Johnson, 940 F. Supp. at 1411.
178. Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 751 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 70 (1996).
179. McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996).
180. See, e.g., Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1502
n.16 (E.D. Va. 1996); Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C.
1996); EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1101 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) (all
citing Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977».
181. See Barnes v. Castle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating that
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the defendants argued that sexual harassment was not sexual
discrimination, because such behavior would not be actionable if
directed against those of the harasser's gender. l83 Disagreeing,
the court stated that even if the parties were of the same gender,
the harassment would not have occurred but for the gender of
the victim.184
This but for test has thus been utilized since to support actions
for same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII. ISS For
example, in Wright v. Methodist Youth Services, Inc./ 86 the
district court allowed a quid pro quo action for same-sel~ sexual
harassment.1B7 Using the but for test, the court reasoned that
the plaintiff would not have been the object of his supervisor's
sexual advances had he been of a different gender. l88 Thus, but
for his gender, the advancements would not have been made. l89
In a hostile environment case, Ecklund v. Fruisz Technology,
Ltd.,190 the court found that the female plaintiff had been the
object of a female co-worker's harassm~nt, including the use of
sexual language and touching the plaintiff, because she was
female; "but for" her sex, she would not have been the target. 191
Courts allowing same-sex sexual harassment claims under
Title VII also have relied upon a plain language argument, which
refers to both the language used by Congress in the statute as
well as the language used by the Supreme Court in Meritor
Savings 192 to establish conclusively an action for sexual
same-sex sexual harassment would still involve "the exaction of a condition which,
but for his or her sex, the employee would not have faced."); Williams v. Saxbe, 413
F. Supp. 654, 659 n.6 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("[A]
finding of discrimination [could] be made if the supervisor were a homosexual.").
182. Bames, 561 F.2d at 983.
183. Id. at 990 n.55.
184. Id.
185. See, e.g., Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 287 (D.D.C. 1995);
EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (M.D. Tenn. 1995); Pritchett v.
Sizeler Real Estate Management Co., No. 93-2351, 1995 WL 241855 (E.D. La. Apr.
25, 1995); Boyd v. Vonnahmen, No. 93-CV-435s.JPG, 1995 WL 420040, at ·2-3 (S.D.
TIl. Mar. 29, 1995); McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Serv., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232
(S.D. Ga. 1995).
186. 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. TIl. 1981).
187. Id. at 310. The plaintiff alleged he was terminated as a result of his rejection
of his homosexual male supervisor's advances. Id. at 308.
188. Id. at 310.
189. Id.
190. 9~5 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Va. 1995).
191. Id. at 339.
192. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1403, 1409 (E.D. Wis. 1996);
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harassment. Some courts have stated that there is nothing in the
language of Title VII indicating that Congress intended to
restrict sexual harassment actions to opposite-sex situations.193
Some courts also cite the language used by the Supreme Court in
Mentor Savings194. to support same-sex sexual harassment
claims because the Court was careful to use gender-neutral
terminology and did not limit its holding to opposite-sex
situations.195 In addition, the Court expressed a desire to reach
the "entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women
in employment."196
Finally, courts also defer to the EEOC's interpretation of Title
VII to allow same-sex sexual harassment claims.197 The EEOC
has been given authority by Congress to implement and enforce
Title VII, and as such, its interpretations of Title VII's coverage
are persuasive authority.198 The EEOC has stated in its
Compliance Manual that harassers and victims do not have to be
of different sexes and that same-sex sexual harassment is
actionable under Title VII.199
In summary, the lone congressional intent theory used by some
courts to deny same-sex sexual harassment claims contrasts with
the attempts of other courts to use combinations of theories to
fashion an action for same-sex sexual harassment claims under
Title VII. These theories include the following: (1) the dicta

Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1500 (E.D. Va.
1996); Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 287 (D.D.C. 1995); Griffith v.
Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1136-37 (C.D. ill. 1995); EEOC v. Walden
Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (M.D. Tenn. 1995).
193. Griffith, 887 F. Supp. at 1136-37; see also McCoy v. Johnson Controls World
Serv., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D. Ga. 1995) ("[T]he plain language of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2 does not limit Title VII to heterosexual harassment.")
194. An example of this gender-neutral language: "[W]hen a supervisor sexually
harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor
'discriminate[sl' on the basis of sex." Mentor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64
(1986) (citation omitted).
195. See Raney, 892 F. Supp. at 287; McCoy, 878 F. Supp. at 232; Walden Book Co.,
885 F. Supp. at 1102.
196. Meritor Sav., 477 U.S. at 64 (citations omitted). This language was cited by the
court in Raney to support a broad interpretation of the scope of Title VII to include
same-sex sexual harassment claims. 892 F. Supp. at 287. _
197. See, e.g., Swage v. The Inn Phila., Civ. A. No. 96-2380, 1996 WL 368316, at *2
(E.D. Pa. June 21, 1996); Gerd v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 934 F. Supp. 357, 361
(D. Colo. 1996); Ecklund v. Fruisz Tech., Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335, 337 (E.D. Va. 1995).
198. See Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 355 (D. Nev.
1996).
199. EEOC COMPL. MAN. (BNA) § 615.2.
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supporting same-sex claims in early cases establishing sexual
harassment as a cause of action under Title VII; (2) the but for
test, which provides that discrimjnatory conduct that would not
occur but for the victim's sex is actionable under Title VII; (3) the
plain language of both Title VII and the Supreme Court's opinion
in Mentor Savings, which lack any indicia that same-sex
harassment claims are not actionable under Title VII; and (4) the
EEOC's interpretation of Title VII favoring same-sex sexual
harassment claims. An analysis of these theories in light of the
historical development of sexual harassment law will
demonstrate that courts allowing same-sex sexual harassment
claims have chosen the better-reasoned course.

m.

HISTORICAL SUPPORT FOR SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARAsSMENT

Although the Fifth Circuit in Garcia held that congressional
intent to balance power relationships in the workplace would not
admit same-sex sexual harassment actions into Title VII's circle
of coverage,200 this view is not supported by the plain language
of the statute, the legislative history of its passage, the earlier
cases recognizing sexual harassment claims under Title VII, or
under the Supreme Court's acknowledgment of sexual
harassment as actionable under Title VII in Mentor Savings.201
Ai!, noted by courts allowing same-sex sexual harassment
claims under Title VII, no language in the statute prohibits its
application to same-sex claims.202 Therefore, there is no clear
statutory bar to allowing same-sex sexual harassment claims
under Title VII. Because of the nature of the amendment process
by which "sex" was added to Title VII protected groups,203
legislative history as to Congress' intent with respect to same-sex
sexual harassment offers little guidance. The scant historical
guidance that does exist does not support the Goluszek theory of
Title VII's "balancing of power" purpose.2M Rather, it seems

200. Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 452 (5th Cir. 1994).
201. 477 u.s. 57, 64, 66 (1986).
202. Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1403, 1409 (E.D. Wis. 1996); Tietgen v.
Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1500 (E.D. Va. 1996); Griffith
v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. ll33, ll36-37 (C.D. lli. 1995); McCoy v.
Johnson Controls World Serv., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
203. See generally llO CONGo REc. 2577-2584 (1964).
204. See Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 286-87 (D.D.C. 1995)
(noting that Goluszek court cited to no congressional record for its support of its
theory of congressional intent, but instead cited to a student-written Note).
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that the congressional intent theory offered by many courts
allowing same-sex claims of sexual harassment is the better
interpretation based on what little can be gleaned from the
legislative history; such courts point to the language of the
statute itself to find that Congress intended to reach all
"disparate treatment of men and women.~ This position is
bolstered by the EEOC's congressionally mandated interpretation
of Title VII to cover same-sex sexual harassment claims.206
ffistorical sexual harassment case law also supports such a
conclusion. The early cases allowing sexual harassment under
Title VII clearly recognized both the possibility and the
appropriateness of same-sex sexual harassment cases being
brought under Title VII. 207 These decisions also recognized the
but for test relied upon by cases allowing same-sex sexual
harassment.208 In addition, the Supreme Court stated in
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson209 that it was Congress' intent
that Title VIPs protections extend across a broad sweep of
"disparate treatment of men and women. n210 Moreover, the
court also carefully used gender-neutral language in defining
sexual harassment under Title VII's sex discrimination
provisions.211 Thus, as stated in cases upholding the viability of
same-sex sexual harassment claims, Title VII cannot be read to
apply to only opposite sex sexual harassment claims.212

205. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vmson, 477 u.s. 57, 64 (1986).
206. See, e.g., Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 355 (D. Nev.
1996).
207. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Williams v. Saxbe,
413 F. Supp. 654, 659 n.6 (D.D.C. 1976).
208. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Raney
v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 287 (D.D.C. 1995); EEOC v. Walden Book
Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (M.D. Tenn. 1995); Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate
Management Co., No. 93-2351, 1995 WL 241855 (E.D. La. Apr. 25, 1995); Boyd v.
Vonnahmen, No. 93·CV-4358-JPG, 1995 WL 420040, at *2-3 (S.D. TIl. Mar. 29, 1995);
McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Serv., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D. Ga. 1995);
Wright v. Methodist Youth Serv., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. lli. 1981).
209. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
210. Id. at 64.
211. Id.
212. Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 287 (D. D.C. 1995); McCoy v.
Johnson Controls World Serv., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D. Ga. 1995); EEOC v.
Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (M.D. Tenn. 1995).

Published by Reading Room, 1997

HeinOnline -- 13 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1125 1996-1997

27

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 9

1126

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:1099

CONCLUSION

Although sex was added as a protected group to Title VII as a
mere afterthought (and probably as a ploy to defeat Title VII),
and although Title VII does not explicitly include sexual
harassment, courts today recognize that both quid pro quo and
hostile environment sexual harassment claims are actionable
under Title VII. Same-sex sexual harassment has only recently
been suggested as a controversial expansion to sexual
harassment law. Proponents of the expansion seek recognition
under the same theories of sexual harassment used in cases
dealing with members of the opposite sex.
Some courts hold that same-sex sexual harassment is not
actionable under Title VII because Congress intended the statute
to equalize power relationships in the workplace between
members of the opposite sex. However, the more correct view,
based upon the plain language of the statute, early case law
interpreting Title VII to cover sexual harassment claims, the
Supreme Court's language in the landmark case of Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, and the EEOC's interpretation of Title
VII, clearly allows same-sex sexual harassment claims to be
brought under Title VII.

Katherine H. Flynn
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